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From Family, They Flee 
ASYLUM FOR VICTIMS OF FORCED MARRIAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
A young woman from the Congo lives in Brooklyn and 
studies chemistry at a college in Queens. As she approaches the 
completion of her chemistry degree, her father informs her he has 
promised her hand in marriage to his fifty-year-old, wealthy 
friend. Upon return to the Congo, she would be forced into a life 
she could not control; where her life would be traded to increase 
her family’s wealth. Extending her student visa, which has given 
her legal status for her entire presence in the United States, seems 
like her best and perhaps only option to remain in the United 
States. Though she has been a science nerd her entire life, to 
maintain her freedom, she switches her major to journalism, 
requiring her to enroll in another year of classes, and her student 
visa can be extended. If she returns to her home country her 
control over her own destiny will be completely stolen. Yet, her 
claim to asylum in the United States is weak. Why? 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses,”1 and yet, forced marriage-based 
asylum claims hold an unfortunate narrative within U.S. 
immigration law. Just when a step forward seems to occur, an 
error in standard of review brings judicial progress to a 
standstill.2 Though forced marriage is an obvious harm worth 
fleeing, American law does not recognize it as such. This is a 
conceptual absurdity3: a “confrontation between the human need 
and the unreasonable silence of the world.”4 There is a human 
need for asylum from forced marriage not recognized by U.S. 
 
 1 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 2 See, e.g., Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. 
Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007). 
 3 Natalie Nanasi, An “I Do” I Choose: How the Fight for Marriage Access 
Supports a Per Se Finding of Persecution for Asylum Cases Based on Forced Marriage, 
28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 48, 50–51 (2014). 
 4 ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 28 (Justin 
O’Brien trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1991) (1955). 
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asylum law. This note will confront this unreasonable silence 
within American jurisprudence and explain how the nature of 
forced marriage, considered in light of a recent Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, allows the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration 
Judges alike5 to grant forced marriage-based asylum applications. 
Forced marriage, by definition, is a marriage that occurs 
without the complete consent of one or both people in the 
marriage. Child marriage is a form of forced marriage, as those 
under 18 are per se unable to consent to the union.6 The State 
Department specifically recognizes that often family members 
are the ones forcing the marriage, through physical violence, 
threats of violence, or both.7 Approximately 15.4 million people 
were slaves to forced marriage in 2016 alone.8 In Africa, nearly 
five people out of every thousand are victims of forced marriage.9 
The barriers to forced marriage-based asylum claims in 
the United States are numerous. First, courts have not held that 
forced marriage is a stand-alone form of persecution;10 second, 
attorneys struggle to identify a legally cognizable “protected 
ground”11 as the reason for the forced marriage persecution; and 
third, judges and attorneys fail to determine the “nexus” 
between forced marriage and a “protected ground.”12 Asylum 
seekers also struggle to prove that the persecutor, if a private 
 
 5 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the administrative 
agency that reviews asylum applications. An applicant for asylum whose claim is denied and is 
currently present in the United States without lawful status is automatically referred to 
immigration court. If an immigration judge denies his or her asylum claim, the applicant can 
then appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.). If the claim is denied again, the 
applicant may appeal to a federal circuit court of appeals. Appeals, JUSTIA, https://
www.justia.com/immigration/appeals/ [https://perma.cc/3GDG-PUJE]; Asylum Law and 
Procedure, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum-law-and-
procedure [https://perma.cc/8F62-E8DW]. 
 6 ALLISON M. GLINSKI, MAGNOLIA SEXTON, & LIS MEYERS, CHILD, EARLY, AND 
FORCED MARRIAGE RESOURCE GUIDE, U.S. AGENCY OF INT’L DEVELOPMENT at v(2015). 
 7 Forced Marriage, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 31, 2018), https://travel.state.gov/
content/travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/forced-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/
8K3R-YFN9]. 
 8 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: FORCED 
LABOUR AND FORCED MARRIAGE 43 (2017). 
 9 Id. at 44. 
 10 Forced marriage, on its own, has yet to be held as a form of persecution 
under U.S. asylum law. Nanasi, supra note 3, at 61, 63–64; see also infra Section II.B.1.  
 11 The “protected ground” requirement is laid out in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) as “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2012 & Supp. II 2014) (emphasis added). Attorneys have attempted 
to define “particular social groups” that forced marriage-based asylum claims could be 
connected to. See infra Section II.B.2.  
 12 The “nexus” requirement is seen in the statutory language of the INA 
through the “on account of” portion of the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (emphasis 
added); see infra Section II.A.  
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actor, is outside of government control, or that the government 
is unwilling to control the actor.13 
The United States Supreme Court has held marriage to be 
“one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men [and women].”14 The freedom to marry has 
not only been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court, but has 
also been expanded through the Court’s recent recognitions of the 
right to marry among homosexual couples.15 The violation of a 
right held so dear to the United States as a nation should qualify 
as persecution for asylum applications, and yet, unfortunately, 
this is still not the case.16 
Changing mores should translate to changing jurisprudence. 
As the world becomes slowly more cognizant of the severe harm of 
forced marriage on an individual, and on the sanctity of marriage 
itself, it is difficult to imagine a judge ruling that forced marriage is 
not a form of persecution.17 Illustratively, in 2006, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized forced marriage 
as a form of persecution.18 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
vacated the decision due to an error in the standard of review.19 This 
lack of legal recognition of forced marriage as persecution, however, 
is not the basis of many courts’ denials of forced marriage-based 
asylum claims. They often deny the claims solely due to a supposed 
lack of the nexus requirement.20 
At the essence of U.S. asylum claims lies the nexus 
between the claimed act or acts of persecution suffered, or to be 
 
 13 See infra Section II.A.  
 14 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 15 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013). 
 16 For example, courts have held that a mere threat of forced marriage does 
not constitute past persecution, or demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
See, e.g., Li Rong Zhang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 494 F. App’x 255, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(holding a threat of forced marriage did not constitute persecution); Shao Lan Yan v. 
Holder, 489 F. App’x 733, 738 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding threat of forced marriage from a 
village chief ’s nephew did not constitute persecution); Xiu Xia Huang v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 286 F. App’x 604, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding fear of forced marriage due to 
harassment from town leader’s son did not constitute persecution). 
 17 See Nanasi, supra note 3, at 4950; see infra Section II.B.1.  
 18 Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Keisler v. 
Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007). 
 19 Id; see also Section II.B.4 (explaining that the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment of the Second Circuit due to the court improperly conducting a de novo inquiry 
into whether a person belongs to a “particular social group”). 
 20 See, e.g., Mei Y. Liu v. Holder, 492 F. App’x 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding 
the harm petitioner suffered during her forced marriage “did not bear nexus to a 
protected ground”); Feng Ming Lin v. Holder, 339 F. App’x 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding petitioner failed to prove forced marriage was connected to the particular social 
group asserted); Lin v. Gonzales, 148 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding arranged 
marriage did not occur on account of a protected ground); see supra note 11 (explaining 
the statutory basis for the nexus requirement). 
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suffered, in one’s home country and the “protected ground” the 
persecution is targeting.21 An asylum applicant must present 
“evidence that an alleged persecutor is motivated by a victim’s 
protected trait.”22 Asylum claims often fall short through failure 
to prove this nexus.23 Consequently, for an asylum case based 
solely on persecution in the form of forced marriage, a clear 
nexus must be drawn between a protected ground and the forced 
marriage itself.24 To prove this connection, an asylum seeker 
must determine a protected ground that the forced marriage 
infringes upon and that motivates the persecutor. 
A victim should not have to suffer the consequences of the 
marriage to find safe harbor from the marriage itself. Yet with forced 
marriage-based asylum claims, the forced marriage is often grouped 
together with other forms of persecution, such as domestic violence, 
spousal rape, or female genital cutting (FGC).25 This treatment 
complicates a solely forced marriage-based claim, especially one 
based on fear of future persecution, as these other harms often occur 
after the forced marriage has begun. Additionally, the persecutors 
themselves are different: the spouse often perpetuates the other 
forms of persecution, while the victim’s family are often the ones 
initially forcing the victim into the marriage.26 
 
 21 See supra note 11 (explaining the statutory basis for the nexus requirement); 
see, e.g., Mei Y. Liu, 492 F. App’x at 198 (“The agency did not err in determining that the 
harm . . . asserted . . . did not bear a nexus to a protected ground. In addition to showing 
past persecution or a well-founded fear, asylum eligibility requires that the persecution 
an individual alleges be on account of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.”). 
 22 In re N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 530 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 23 See, e.g., Gilca v. Holder, 680 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding asylum 
seeker presented no evidence random assailants attacked him due to his Roma descent 
or political opinions); Sompotan v. Mukasey 533 F.3d 63, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding 
store robbery was not motivated by any protected ground, and respondent was poisoned 
due to a personal dispute with his neighbor, not due to his protected ground). 
 24 See supra note 11 (explaining the statutory basis for the nexus requirement); 
see supra note 20 (providing an example of case law interpretation of the statute). 
 25 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (the BIA granted an asylum 
claim where the persecution was FGC and recognized the central role a forced marriage had in 
the FGC); Forced Marriage, ASIAN PAC. INST. ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (2017), 
https://www.api-gbv.org/about-gbv/types-of-gbv/forced-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/5LA4-P3HB] 
(“Forced marriage is gender-based violence . . . that can lead to increased vulnerability to abuses 
including coerced sexual initiation, marital rape, statutory rape, suppression of sexual 
orientation or gender identity, interrupted education, domestic violence by husbands and in-
laws, transnational abandonment, reproductive coercion resulting in early and/or multiple 
pregnancies, and femicide.”); see also Female Genital Mutilation, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ [https://perma.cc/D6HG-U92N] (“FGM is often 
considered a necessary part of raising a girl, and a way to prepare her for adulthood and 
marriage.”); infra Section II.B.1.  
 26 See Brief for the Respondent, at 27, In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 
1995) (No. A73-476-695), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2000/03/28/
kasinga2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGT7-ST6Z] (Kasindja stated that now that she was married, 
her husband could force her to have her genitals mutilated); Female Genital Mutilation, supra 
note 25 (“The practice [of FGC] is mostly carried out by traditional circumcisers, who often 
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Courts continue to deny forced marriage-based asylum 
claims, despite the harm the asylum seekers would face if they 
were to return to their country of origin.27 Currently, forced 
marriage-based asylum claims attempt to attach themselves to a 
“mixed” protected ground of “particular social group” (PSG), 
“nationality,” and (albeit rarely) “political opinion.”28 These 
approaches fall short of satisfying the nexus requirement.29 
Therefore, a new avenue to forced marriage-based claims is 
needed. A 2017 BIA decision, Matter of L-E-A-, might hold the 
answer.30 In Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA fully defined how asylum 
seekers must satisfy the nexus requirement when they assert 
family membership as their “particular social group,” a protected 
ground for purposes of asylum claims.31 This note will refrain from 
arguing too fervently as to why forced marriage is a harm, and 
instead will focus on proving the nexus between the protected 
ground of the family unit and the harm of forced marriage. 
Although Matter of L-E-A- did not involve a forced 
marriage-based claim, its reasoning is relevant.32 Membership 
within a particular family unit is often why a young person is forced 
into marriage. Typically, older, more powerful family members 
force the family’s younger generation into marriages to confer a 
benefit on the family as a whole.33 Families use forced marriage to 
alleviate themselves from poverty, increase their wealth, forge new 
family alliances, or to preserve family honor.34 The persecution—
the forced marriage—is motivated by the victim’s place within the 
family and forces the victim to join another family, thus infringing 
upon the victim’s “protected ground” of family membership.35 
Therefore, asylum applicants who fear being forced into marriage 
by their families, or have already been forced into marriage by their 
 
play other central roles in communities, such as attending childbirths.”); ASIAN PAC. INST. ON 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, supra note 25; see also infra Section II.B.1.  
 27 See supra note 20 (providing examples of cases where forced marriage 
asylum cases failed due to failure to prove the nexus requirement). 
 28 See infra Section II.B.2.  
 29 See supra note 20 (providing examples of cases where forced marriage 
asylum cases failed due to failure to prove the nexus requirement). 
 30 See infra Part III. 
 31 In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43–46 (B.I.A. 2017). 
 32 Id. at 41. 
 33 See infra Part I. See generally NAÏMA BENDRISS, REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF 
FORCED MARRIAGE IN CANADA: INTERVIEWS WITH FRONTLINE WORKERS (2008), https://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/fm-mf/fm_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC2B-VZZY] 
(reporting on the varying reasons why families force their younger members into marriage). 
 34 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 12, 14, 18. 
 35 See L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 3–5 (explaining how the nexus requirement of 
asylum claims must be met where the particular social group asserted is membership in a 
particular family unit). 
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families, should assert their protected ground as the PSG of 
membership within their family unit. 
Part I of this note discusses why many forced marriages 
occur and argues that family ties motivate many of these 
marriages. Part II discusses asylum requirements, how they have 
been applied to forced marriage-based asylum claims, how courts 
currently treat these claims, and problems with current 
approaches. Part III outlines how Matter of L-E-A- defined the 
nexus requirement in family unit-based asylum claims. Part IV 
asserts that, in light of Matter of L-E-A-, many forced marriage-
based asylum claims can be attached to the protected ground of 
family membership, thus solving the nexus requirement of the 
claims due to the primarily family-based motivations behind many 
forced marriages. Ultimately, this note answers the question of 
how, in light of this new decision, and due to the nature of these 
abuses, forced marriage-based asylum claims can find a new and 
more secure place within American jurisprudence. 
I. THE FORCE OF FAMILY 
Family-based motivations fuel many forced marriages.36 A 
family may force a daughter or a son into marriage to gain more 
 
 36 See BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 12, 14, 18, 20 (reporting on the varying reasons 
why families force their younger members into marriage); RACHEL CLAWSON, FORCED 
MARRIAGE AND LEARNING DISABILITIES: MULTI-AGENCY PRACTICE GUIDELINES 13 (2010) 
(reporting on the motivations behind forced marriages specifically involving people with 
learning disabilities, and noting that “[p]arents who force their children to marry often justify 
their action as . . . building stronger family ties”); FREE THE SLAVES, WIVES IN SLAVERY: 
FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE CONGO, 17–20 (2013) (“[F]orced marriages [can] allow[ ]  
forgiveness of a debt owed by a bride’s family. Forgiving a debt in these cases is viewed by the 
families as equivalent to paying a dowry. This can be a very strong incentive for forcing a 
daughter to marry, especially for a family that is otherwise unable to pay its debt, notably if 
the family faces legal action or violence if the debt goes unpaid. . . . In some parts of the DRC, 
there is a ritual where a family arranges a marriage, but the girl or woman involved is not 
aware, and she is actually ‘captured’ or kidnapped by her husband. This ritual in some 
communities is customary and considered normal. . . . In many cases the kidnapping ritual 
also involves a bride-price or other financial gain paid to the bride’s family, or includes debt 
forgiveness. . . . [Child] marriage is more frequent among financially desperate families. 
Because of poverty, if it means he will have one less mouth to feed, a father will give his 
daughter away.”); GLINSKI, SEXTON, & MEYERS, supra note 6, at 11–12. (“[P]arents may 
marry their daughters early because girls are seen as economic burdens that can be relieved 
through marriage. Marriage-related financial transactions can contribute to such 
perceptions: in contexts where bride wealth or bride price is practiced (that is, a groom or 
groom’s family provides assets to the bride’s family in exchange for marriage), families may 
reap immediate economic benefits from marrying off their daughters.” (footnote omitted)); 
Aisha K. Gill & Heather Harvey, Examining the Impact of Gender on Young People’s Views of 
Forced Marriage in Britain, 12 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 72, 94 (2017) (study listing alleviating 
familial poverty as one of the motivations behind forced marriages); Laura Stark, Motives and 
Agency in Forced Marriage Among the Urban Poor in Tanzania, ETHNOS 6 (Jan. 2, 2019)(“In 
[one] type of forced marriage, daughters are pressured by parents to marry a man not chosen 
by or necessarily known to them. He may be an older, wealthier man willing to pay to her 
parents the customary brideprice . . . . Both male and female interviewees mentioned 
2019] FROM FAMILY, THEY FLEE 1033 
wealth for the family, to bolster the social status of the family, or 
to create an official alliance between two families.37 Simply put, 
in many cases of forced marriage, a family is saying to their 
younger generation: because of your place within our family, you 
must marry. While marriage should be grounded in love,38 it is 
instead often a family’s necessity of escaping poverty, or more 
depressingly, it is “the sour, stifled smell of greed, which is the 
opposite of love,”39 that fuels the practice of forced marriage.40 
A. Family Matters, and Marriage Is a “Family Matter”41 
Widespread reporting emphasizes the existence of 
familial motivations behind many forced marriages across the 
globe.42 Illustratively, a 2008 Canadian study delving into the 
motivations behind forced marriage listed nine main reasons for 
the practice.43 All nine suggested a motivating familial benefit, 
 
daughters being ‘forced to marry’ or ‘giving in’ to their parents’ plans for them to marry a man 
who could help support the family.”); Being Forced to Marry, CHILDLINE, https://
www.childline.org.uk/info-advice/bullying-abuse-safety/crime-law/forced-marriage/ [https://
perma.cc/V9DT-KQS9] (listing reasons families force their younger members to marry); Fiona 
David, Why Forced Marriage?, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. NEWS (Sept. 19, 2017), https://
news.trust.org/item/20170918115342-4ztc2 [https://perma.cc/RU75-P2JK] (“[Y]oung girls 
and women are forced to marry in exchange for payment to their families, the cancellation of 
debt, or to settle family disputes.”); Forced Marriages, TEES CHILD PROTECTION, http://
www.teescpp.org.uk/forced-marriages [https://perma.cc/2BP8-Z67E] (listing various reasons 
a parent or family might force a young person into marriage); Forced Marriages, SHEFFIELD 
SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN BOARD, https://sheffieldscb.proceduresonline.com/chapters/
p_forced.html#motives [https://perma.cc/NY77-EJ75] (listing the various reasons families f
orced their children into marriage); Forced Marriage, IRANIAN & KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS 
ORG. (2019), http://ikwro.org.uk/forced-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/H9WN-NZXF] (“Families 
may force marriage due to pressure from their own relatives, to keep control over young 
people, to build links with their families in their countries of origin, among other 
motivations.”); André Leslie & Samantha Early, Forced Marriage Is Not Culture, It’s Abuse, 
DW (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.dw.com/en/forced-marriage-is-not-culture-its-abuse/a-
17075444 [https://perma.cc/TT92-RDEP] (Forced marriages “happen because families are 
motivated to ensure that these marriages take place within their families. . . . [T]hey want to 
maintain . . . cultural links. . . . Families think they know best for their child.”); Mariah Long, 
Reasons for Forced Marriage, END SLAVERY NOW (Apr. 14, 2016) https://
www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/reasons-for-forced-marriage [https://perma.cc/Q7C3-
RMSE] (listing reasons families force their members into marriage); see also Simin Montazari 
et al., Determinants of Early Marriage from Married Girls’ Perspectives in Iranian Setting: A 
Qualitative Study, J ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH 3–4 (Mar. 30, 2016) (listing “family structure,” 
meaning the “socioeconomic difficulties, cultural family values, and religious beliefs,” as the 
first category of determinants of “early” marriage in Iran). 
 37 See sources cited supra note 36. 
 38 D’vera Cohn, Love and Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb 13, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/13/love-and-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/82AH-
8EZD] (2010 survey determined that eighty-four percent of unmarried persons and 
ninety-three percent of married persons believe marriage should be based in love). 
 39 GREGORY DAVID ROBERTS, SHANTARAM 4 (St. Martin’s Press 2004) (2003). 
 40 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 14–15. 
 41 Id. at 11. 
 42 See sources cited supra note 36. 
 43 See BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 11–16. 
1034 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
and seven of them were primarily family-based reasons.44 While 
forced marriage is often a “mixed motive”45 form of persecution, 
with the reasons being “complicated and intertwined,”46 often 
the central, motivating factor behind this type of persecution is 
a family-based objective.47 In many cases the younger 
generation’s place in the family is being traded, sold, or given 
away to benefit the family as a whole, while forcing a particular 
young person into a life they never desired.48 
Poverty is arguably the prevailing motivation behind 
families forcing their younger members into marriage.49 A 
marriage to a wealthy spouse can be “[a] guarantee against 
poverty,”50 through an alliance to a wealthy family, or from the 
windfall from a “brideprice.”51 The grip of poverty has led such a 
large number of families to sell their daughters into marriages 
that “brideprice” traditions have become a norm in many 
cultures,52 particularly in certain regions such as “Afghanistan, 
sub-Saharan Africa, Iraq and rural China.”53 
For impoverished families, marriage can be used as 
currency.54 An African woman in a focus group for a qualitative, 
empirical study on forced marriage noted: 
Poverty is the major thing . . . if she [prospective in-laws] gives money, 
the family won’t ask [for the young woman’s consent] . . . the money 
will buy rice for them . . . Because of money, they will send their kids 
[for marriage]. . . . Your father possesses you then your husband 
possesses you there is nowhere to go . . . Women are money . . . they 
say the more girls you have the more you will get richer . . . .55 
 
 44 Id. at 11–17. “Pregnancy out-of-wedlock” and “to protect young women” are 
motivations that do not, on their face, implicate a familial benefit, but in both scenarios, 
the study states that protecting family reputation and upholding family honor are 
nevertheless underlying motivations. 
 45 Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[A]sylum is still 
proper in mixed-motive cases even where one motive would not be the basis for asylum, 
so long as one of the statutory protected grounds is ‘at least one central reason’ for the 
persecution.”(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009)). 
 46 About Forced Marriage, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR. (2019), http://preventforced
marriage.org/about-forced-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/3MK8-BXW5]. 
 47 Nanasi, supra note 3, at 67. 
 48 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 11–16. 
 49 Khatidja Chantler et al., Forced Marriage in the UK: Religious, Cultural, 
Economic or State Violence?, 29 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 587, 603 (2009); see also BENDRISS, 
supra note 33, at 14–15. 
 50 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 14. 
 51 Aisha K. Gill & Sunari Anitha, Introduction: Framing Forced Marriage as a 
Form of Violence Against Women, in FORCED MARRIAGE: INTRODUCING A SOCIAL JUSTICE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 1, 10 (AISHA K. GILL & SUNDARI ANITHA eds., 2011). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Chantler et al., supra note 49, at 603. 
 55 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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When the economic incentive in forcing children into marriage 
is high,56 having children in the first place becomes even more 
desirable.57 In some situations, families are procreating for the 
sole purpose to sell off their female daughters,58 who have little 
to no means of escaping this sale.59 The class structures that 
govern a young person’s life essentially hold them hostage to the 
will of their families, who then pass them along into a new 
hostage situation: the forced marriage.60 
A family might have good intentions in forcing their 
children to marry. For example, a family might feel the marriage 
protects their son or daughter, by giving them economic security 
for their future, or by ensuring that they will be under the care 
of someone the family knows.61 Additionally, a family might be 
using the marriage “[t]o save family honor.”62 Marriage, in some 
cultures, is seen as a “matter of identity,”63 and is used as a 
means to ensure that the younger generation stays firmly rooted 
within the family’s culture, religion, or nationality, and upholds 
their family’s legacy.64 In an increasingly global society, 
marriage is being used as a defense against the westernization 
of a family’s younger generation.65 Despite any good intentions, 
these marriages are often against the young person’s will. 
 
 56 About Forced Marriage, supra note 46. 
 57 See Chantler et al., supra note 49, at 603. 
 58 A member of a focus group conducted with members of different African 
communities and Ugandan professionals noted: 
Because if a father thinks, believes, that he can get so many manner of cattle 
or dowry, out of this one girl, and he can use that for three of his sons, to marry, 
to get them wives, then he’s going to get that girl out of school at thirteen. 
Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See REFUGE, FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE UK: A SCOPING STUDY ON THE 
EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN FROM MIDDLE EASTERN AND NORTH EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITIES 
10–12, http://www.refuge.org.uk/files/1001-Forced-Marriage-Middle-East-North-East-
Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8L2-954D]. 
 61 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 12 (“[Families] seek to ensure a solid future for 
their daughters by marrying them to men whom they consider to be best for them as 
knowledge of the suitor’s family or relatives gives them the feeling that their daughter will 
be protected. In fact, they entrust their daughter to a husband and in-laws whom they trust 
and with whom they have a ties of honour, which they see as a guarantee of security and 
proper treatment for the young wife among in-laws who will not treat her as an outsider.”). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 12–13. 
 65 See About Forced Marriage, supra note 46; Sally Howard, Forced Marriage: The 
Survivors’ Tales, TELEGRAPH (June 21, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-
life/10909788/Forced-marriage-the-survivors-tales.html [https://perma.cc/ZK49-8XA2]. In 
the same vein as preserving family honor, forced marriage might be used to deal with 
pregnancy out of wedlock. The Canadian study asserts: 
Cases of families who force their young girls into an undesired marriage to 
repair the “mistake” of pregnancy out of wedlock and thereby avoid losing face 
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The myriad of reasons families force their members into 
marriage all have one thing in common: but-for the young 
person’s place within the particular family unit, the young 
person would not be a victim of the forced marriage. While the 
means, the forced marriage, provides different families with 
different ends, these ends all specifically benefit the original 
family unit through the young person’s original kinship ties. 
Families are motivated by the place of the victim within the 
family unit and how that place may be traded, and thus changed, 
to confer a benefit on the family as a whole. 
B. The Difficulty of Fleeing from Family 
The difficulty of escape from these forced marriages 
further demonstrates the strength of the family-based 
motivations behind the practice. Upon refusing to go through 
with a forced marriage, a person may be subjected to myriad of 
abuses, such as physical abuse, death threats, emotional abuse, 
false imprisonment, rape, and preventing access to money, 
perpetuated by both the potential spouse, and family members 
involved.66 In escaping a forced marriage, a young person could 
be faced with the choice: go through with the marriage, or 
abandon one’s family.67 Sometimes this choice is non-existent, as 
young people in poverty, or communities run by strict cultural 
expectations, cannot escape their families.68 A person might lack 
the economic means to escape, or might fear death or severe 
injury for refusing the marriage.69 
 
are also mentioned. Several women who fled to battered women’s shelters 
hoping to find protection from conjugal violence told social workers that they 
had been forced by their parents to marry the father of the child conceived out 
of wedlock. Those marriages took place in Latin American countries where the 
young women had had sexual relations with men with whom they were not 
planning to spend their lives. When they found they were pregnant, they told 
their parents, who compelled them, despite their protests, to marry the father 
of the child they were expecting so that their reputation would not be damaged. 
BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 16. 
 66 REFUGE, supra note 60, at 10. For example, uncles threatened to kill their niece 
after she tried to run away from her controlling family. Fearing for her life and safety, she 
returned and consequently, was forced, against her will, into a marriage to a distant family 
member. Howard, supra note 65. 
 67 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 20. 
 68 Id. at 20–21. 
 69 Catherine Deveney, Without Consent: The Truth About Forced Marriage, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/11/forced-
marriage-pakistan-matrimony-laws [https://perma.cc/86AX-F9J4]. 
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Furthermore, the pressures of family and culture blur the 
line as to where consent ends and coercion begins.70 Engrained 
from birth to follow certain familial or cultural practices, a young 
person might not outwardly oppose being forced into a 
marriage.71 Thus consent, in terms of a forced marriage, should 
be viewed on a spectrum that takes into account factors such as 
a victim’s age, economic means, culture, and place of birth.72 
Failure to account for such a spectrum is particularly troubling 
legally, especially if one is claiming an instance of past 
persecution.73 In In re Kasinga, the seminal BIA case dealing 
with the harm of forced marriage, the Immigration and 
Nationality Service (INS)74 argued that if a woman had 
“consented” or “acquiesced” to FGC, she should not be eligible for 
asylum.75 If the government were to extend that reasoning to 
forced marriage-based claims, all applicants who married 
“willingly” to please their family, or because they felt they had 
no other choice, would be barred from achieving asylum.76 
The family pressure to marry can be so high that victims 
consider suicide as their only option out.77 By refusing to go through 
with a family-arranged forced marriage, a young person could 
essentially isolate themselves from their entire family.78 Pressure 
from family is high enough, even without the strain of poverty.79 
These marriages are often a family’s only ticket to their next meal; 
thus poverty, combined with cultural expectations and familial 
pressures, often render many of these marriages inescapable.80 
 
 70 Sunari Anitha & Aisha K. Gill., Reconceptualising Consent and Coercion 
Within an Intersectional Understanding of Forced Marriage, in FORCED MARRIAGE, 
supra note 51, at 47, 53. 
 71 Id. at 52–54. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 371 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 74 The Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) was abolished in 2003. Its 
functions are now carried out by USCIS, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which are all components of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Our History, USCIS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/G93J-QTMC]. 
 75 Kasinga, 21 I & N. Dec. at 371. 
 76 Jenni Millbank & Catherine Dauvergne, Forced Marriage and the Exoticization 
of Gendered Harms in United States Asylum Law, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 898, 927 (2010). 
 77 Deveney, supra note 69. 
 78 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 17–20. 
 79 See MARIANNE HESTER ET AL., FORCED MARRIAGE: THE RISK FACTORS AND 
THE EFFECT OF RAISING THE MINIMUM AGE FOR A SPONSOR AND OF LEAVE TO ENTER THE 
UK AS A SPOUSE OR FIANCÉ(E) 30–32 (2007). 
 80 See BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 14–16; Chantler et al., supra note 49, at 603. 
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II. ASYLUM AND THE PRACTICE OF FORCED MARRIAGE  
A. An Overview of Asylum 
To file for asylum, a person must be present in the United 
States and must file their application within one-year of entry 
into the United States, with certain exceptions.81 For a person to 
be eligible for asylum they must be “unable or unwilling to 
return to, and . . . unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself” 
of his or her home country due to “persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”82 
For the purposes of this note, this can be synthesized into three 
prima facie requirements: (1) past persecution, or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution; (2) membership in one of the five 
enumerated protected grounds; and (3) a nexus between the 
protected ground and the persecution.83 
The first requirement of asylum, persecution, has not 
been formally defined in the INA. The BIA has vaguely opined 
that persecution is “a threat to . . . life or freedom” or an 
“infliction of suffering or harm,” perhaps consisting of 
 
 81 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). These 
exceptions include “changed circumstances” and “extraordinary circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(2)(D). Changed circumstances include changed country conditions and other 
“circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” DHS 
Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4) (2018). Extraordinary circumstances 
include events or factors such as physical, mental, and legal disabilities and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). 
 82 Governing U.S. asylum law is the definition of the term “refugee” under 
section 1101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states: 
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012 & Supp. II 2014). This definition governs asylum applications 
because the only difference between a refugee and someone applying for asylum is that the 
refugee is outside of the United States when they apply for asylum, while an asylum seeker 
is already present in the U.S. at time of application. An asylum seeker may already have 
lawful status, or may not. Refugees & Asylum, USCIS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum [https://perma.cc/RM3X-UARS]. 
 83 There are numerous bars to asylum such as firm resettlement in another 
country prior to arrival in the United States, a conviction for a serious crime, engagement 
in terrorist activity, and previously persecuting others. See Immigration and Nationality 
Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (2012); Asylum Bars, USCIS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-bars [https://
perma.cc/VB85-W9BK]. 
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confinement, torture, or economic deprivation84 and that “[t]he 
harm or suffering need not [only] be physical, but may take other 
forms, such as . . . the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, 
employment or other essentials of life.”85 The BIA has avoided 
placing strict guidelines on what forms of mistreatment 
constitute persecution, and instead, has emphasized that 
whether a harm amounts to persecution should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.86 In Matter of Acosta, the seminal BIA 
decision on asylum claims where the protected ground asserted 
is membership in a particular social group, the BIA defined 
persecution as “harm or suffering . . . inflicted upon an 
individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or 
characteristic a persecutor sought to overcome.”87 Following the 
BIA’s decision in Acosta, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that the punitive intent was, in fact, not 
required and that courts should focus solely on the intent of a 
persecutor to “overcome a characteristic of the victim.”88 In other 
words, the persecutor need not believe that they are punishing 
or harming their victim for their actions to amount to 
persecution, but they must intend to infringe upon the protected 
characteristic of the asylum seeker. This requirement of intent 
bleeds into the nexus factor, discussed subsequently. 
Under asylum law, the persecutor may be either a public or 
private actor. In forced marriage-based asylum claims, the 
persecutor is typically a private actor, often the victim’s own family.89 
If the persecutor is a private actor, the individual or group must be 
one that the government of the applicant’s home country is “unable 
or unwilling” to control.90 The BIA has held that persecution 
perpetuated within a family unit can be outside of a government’s 
control.91 An applicant’s failure to report the persecution to the 
government or law enforcement is not “outcome determinative” as 
long as the applicant can prove a systemic reluctance to punish those 
engaged in the particular form of persecution.92 
The INA defines the second requirement, the “protected 
ground,” as “race, religion, nationality, membership in a  
 84 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 85 In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 171 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 86 See, e.g., In re L-K, 23 I. & N. Dec. 677, 682–83 (B.I.A. 2004); In re O-Z- & I-
Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 87 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 88 Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 89 Nanasi, supra note 3, at 66–68. 
 90 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 91 See In re S–A–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1333–35 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding an 
abusive father in Morocco to be outside of government control). 
 92 Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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particular social group, or political opinion.”93 The protected 
ground of particular social group (PSG) can be particularly hard 
to define. In Acosta, the BIA defined a PSG as those who “share 
a common, immutable characteristic,” including “sex, color, or 
kinship ties, or in some circumstances . . . a shared past 
experience such as former military leadership or land 
ownership.”94 The BIA further opined that courts may determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether commonly held characteristics 
satisfy the definition of a PSG, but clarified that the 
characteristics must be those that are unable to be changed, or 
should not be required to change as they are “fundamental to 
individual identity.”95 The PSGs asserted in asylum claims are 
often very specific and tailored to a particular claim.96 Therefore, 
PSG-based asylum claims often pose problems for asylum 
applicants. If there is no relevant precedent asserting the PSG 
to which the applicant is claiming membership, an applicant will 
not know whether the group will be recognized until the 
applicant’s claim is adjudicated. 
The third requirement is that the “persecution or [the] 
well-founded fear of persecution [must be] on account of [the 
protected ground].”97 This is the “nexus” requirement:98 the 
persecution claimed must have occurred due to an applicant’s 
protected ground.99 If the asylum seeker was persecuted for a 
“facially neutral” reason, asylum officers and immigration 
judges will deny the claim.100 The asylum applicant must 
produce evidence that allows a fact-finder to reasonably 
conclude “that the harm was motivated by a protected ground.”101 
Considering the recent history of courts denying forced 
marriage-based asylum claims, it is important to note, that if a 
 
 93 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) . 
 94 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See, e.g., Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (PSG 
asserted was “[f]emale widows in Cameroon”); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 
1994) (court recognized the PSG of “Iranian women who advocate [for] women’s rights 
or . . . oppose Iranian customs relating to dress and behavior”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996) (young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern 
Togo who did not undergo “[female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and 
who oppose the practice”); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 343 (B.I.A. 1996) (members of 
the Marehan subclan of Somalia who “share ties of kinship . . . [and] are identifiable as 
a group based upon linguistic commonalities”). 
 97 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012 & Supp. II 2014). 
 98 In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43–44 (B.I.A. 2017). 
 99 See generally INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (describing the 
nexus requirement of asylum claims). 
 100 See, e.g., Gilca v. Holder, 680 F.3d 109, 116 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 101 In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 490 (B.I.A. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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connection is required, the objects on either side of the connection 
must be different from one another—the protected ground cannot 
be the same as the persecution.102 To provide a clear example, 
imagine a government official imprisoning a member of an 
opposition party for organizing a peaceful protest against the 
government. In that case, the persecution is the imprisonment, and 
the protected ground is the person’s political opinion. Nexus 
between the two exists as the victim’s political opinion, and 
expression of such opinion, motivated the government official to 
throw the asylum seeker in prison. The political opinion is different 
than, and separate from, the act of imprisonment, allowing the 
persecution to be motivated by the protected ground. 
While the need to define a protected ground separate from 
the alleged persecution is not necessarily a hard requirement, 
immigrant advocacy groups recommend that attorneys refrain 
from alleging particular social groups that are based on the 
persecution itself.103 In fact, several courts have denied asylum 
 
 102 See, e.g., Juarez Chilel v. Holder, 779 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the social group asserted was based upon a circular reasoning where suffering 
violence was a defining characteristic of the group). Rreshpja v Ashcroft, 420 F.3d 551, 
556 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the PSG of young, attractive Albanian women who are 
forced into prostitution as circularly defined by persecution); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 
F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We agree that under the statute a ‘particular social group’ 
must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.”). 
 103 Practice Advisory: Matter of A-B- Considerations, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. 3 
(2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/matter_a_b_considerations-2018092
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/54KL-F3N6] (“We advise applicants to refrain from defining their 
social group(s) solely by the harm they faced to avoid an accusation of circular reasoning.”); 
Asylum Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B, NAT’L IMMIGRANT 
JUSTICE CTR. 17 (2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/
resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final
%20-%206.21.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LWV-87CW](“Do NOT define the PSG by the harm 
suffered or feared . . . . [R]eferencing the harm suffered does not necessarily invalidate the 
social group . . . . However, it will make the nexus element almost impossible to prove because 
of the circularity problem.”); CGRS Advice—Female Genital Cutting Asylum Cases, CTR. FOR 
GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. 7 (Apr. 2012) (“The attorney should avoid defining the social group 
solely by the harm the client has experienced or will likely experience . . . because this is 
circular reasoning. . . . This reasoning is unsound; consequently, circular social groups are not 
cognizable. . . . Even if a circular social group is recognized by the Immigration Judge (‘IJ’), a 
grant of asylum on this basis will likely be reversed on appeal.”); Children’s Asylum Claims: 
CGRS Practice Advisory, CTR FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. 12 (Mar. 2015) (“Attorneys 
should generally avoid defining the social group solely or primarily by the harm suffered or 
feared. For example ‘abused children,’ which is defined by past harm, and ‘children at risk of 
child abuse,’ which is defined by risk of future harm are not cognizable groups. They are 
circularly defined; that is, rather than setting out the characteristics targeted (e.g. childhood 
and lack of parental protection, childhood and status in the family, etc.), they focus on the fact 
that the child was or will be targeted. A child may be abused because of the child’s status in 
a family or because of societal views regarding children, but s/he is not abused because s/he 
is abused.”); see also Christopher C. Malwitz, Particular Social Groups: Vague Definitions and 
an Indeterminate Future for Asylum Seekers, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (2018) (“[T]here 
can be no circularly defined groups—a group that has been persecuted cannot be defined by 
such persecution. Instead, there must be some underlying, unifying (and now visible) 
reasoning for that persecution, and which is the basis for such targeted mistreatment.”). 
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claims due to this “circular” reasoning.104 While there are some 
instances where particular social groups alleged may reference 
the harm itself, they are limited to “continuing harms.” 
Currently, courts only apply the “continuing harm” analysis to a 
narrow set of harms: FGC and forced sterilization, both 
physically irreversible procedures.105 Additionally, recent 
decisions from the Trump administration highlight the need to 
define a protected ground separate from the harm of forced 
marriage. In Matter of A-B-, the decision stripping eligibility for 
asylum from victims of domestic violence from the Northern 
Triangle, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions based his 
holding, in part, on the fact that the social group defined in these 
claims often referenced the persecution itself.106 
B. Forced Marriage and its Forced Place Within American 
Asylum Jurisprudence 
1. Forced Marriage as a Form of Persecution 
As an initial matter, forced marriage, on its own, has not 
been expressly recognized as a harm great enough to constitute 
persecution.107 This lack of recognition directly opposes the large 
amount of published research on the extreme physical, mental, and 
emotional harms forced marriage brings upon its victims.108 
Further, the Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of the 
legal right to choose a spouse.109 Domestically, the U.S. Department 
of State recognizes forced marriage as a human rights abuse—it 
warns those travelling of the harm and suggests available 
 
 104 See supra note 102 (citing cases where claims were denied due to this 
circular form of reasoning). 
 105 Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding forced 
sterilization to be a “continuing harm”; Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 800 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (extending the continuing harm analysis to FGM). Other circuits, however, 
have declined to extend the continuing harm analysis to FGM. Diallo v. Mukasey, 268 
F. App’x 373, 380 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Zsaleh E. Harivandi, Note, Female Genital 
Mutilation as a Basis for Asylum, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 599, 620 (2010). 
 106 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334–35 (A.G. 2018). 
 107 Nanasi, supra note 3, at 50. 
 108 See, e.g., BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 22–23; Nanasi, supra note 3, at 50–51; 
Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced 
Marriage: Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 131, 133 (2007); Forced 
Marriage, supra note 25; see also Gill & Anitha, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing forced 
marriage from a social justice and human rights perspective); see also supra note 36 
(various reports on the practice of forced marriage, its motivations, and resulting harms). 
 109 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding the 
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry); United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (striking down DOMA, which exempted same-sex couples from 
being recognized as spouses under federal law). 
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remedies to those who are victims.110 Internationally, UN treaties 
recognize forced marriage as a human rights violation and in 2007, 
an international criminal tribunal in Sierra Leone recognized 
forced marriage as an inhumane act.111 Even linguistically, the act 
of forced marriage suggests harm: “the term ‘violence’ refers to the 
Latin word for ‘forced.’”112 And yet, despite this overwhelming 
recognition, U.S. asylum law has still not accepted forced marriage 
as persecution in its own right.113 
U.S. asylum decisions recognize that the harms stemming 
from forced marriage, such as domestic violence, rape, and FGC, 
are enough to constitute persecution.114 Currently, forced 
marriage-based asylum claims often “hinge more on risk of [these] 
related harms which have already been found to constitute 
persecution.”115 In In Re Kasinga, the BIA did not substantively 
deal with forced marriage as a harm on its own, but recognized 
forced marriage as a central component to the applicant’s claim of 
FGC.116 In her brief, Kassindja117 wrote, “[n]ow that I am married, 
my husband has the right to demand . . . that I be circumcised 
according to tradition. The rest of the community will not protect 
me since a husband has a right to say what will happen to his 
wife.”118 The BIA’s recognition of the centrality of the marriage to 
Kassindja’s subjection to FGC laid the groundwork for proving 
that forced marriage is a harm that should be considered a form 
of persecution.119 Since forced marriage is the root cause of many 
harms recognized as persecution, forced marriage should also 
constitute persecution.120 
 
 110 Forced Marriage, supra note 7. 
 111 See G.A. Res. 1763 (XVII) A, Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum 
Age for Marriage, art.1 (Dec. 9, 1964), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
MinimumAgeForMarriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/HNA6-VPPE]; Gill & Anitha, supra note 
51, at 7; Rachel Slater, Gender Violence or Violence against Women? The Treatment of Forced 
Marriage in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 732, 740 (2012). 
 112 Gill & Anitha, supra note 51, at 2. 
 113 Nanasi, supra note 3, at 53. 
 114 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 374 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum 
claim based on fear of FGC rather than fear of impending forced marriage). 
 115 Kim Thuy Seelinger, Forced Marriage and Asylum: Perceiving the Invisible 
Harm, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 55, 57 (2010); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 
F.3d 785, 799 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that FGC is an act of persecution). 
 116 Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 374. 
 117 The first immigration officer misspelt Kasinndja’s name as “Kasinga,” thus 
the discrepancy between her name and the case name. Millbank & Dauvergne, supra 
note 76, at 922 n.74. 
 118 See Brief for the Respondent, at 10, In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 
1995) (No. A73-476-695), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2000/03/
28/kasinga2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGT7-ST6Z]. 
 119 See Millbank & Dauvergne, supra note 76, at 923. 
 120 See id. 
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Forced marriage should be a stand-alone form of persecution 
for purposes of U.S. asylum claims, but given that the INA does not 
define persecution, proving why is better left to psychologists and 
sociologists. Recent BIA and federal court decisions demonstrate a 
trend towards the United States eventually recognizing forced 
marriage as a form of persecution for asylum claims121 and extensive 
research concerning the harm of forced marriage is easily accessible. 
Thus, the pressing legal issue facing these claims lies in determining 
the nexus, and accordingly, a “protected ground” that the harm of 
forced marriage is infringing upon.122 
2. The Difficulty in Defining a PSG for a Forced 
Marriage-Based Claim 
Currently, PSGs asserted in forced marriage-based 
asylum claims often consist of a combination of characteristics, 
including gender, age, religion, nationality, and ethnic 
membership.123 In Ying Lin v. U.S. Attorney General, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied a forced 
marriage-based asylum claim.124 The applicant asserted 
membership to a PSG of “unmarried women in a lower social class 
or in a rural area.”125 The court reasoned that no nexus existed 
between the protected ground and the harm as the central reason 
the petitioner was forced into the marriage was to repay her 
mother’s gambling debt, which was not connected to the 
characteristics asserted in the PSG. 126 In Kasinga, the court 
recognized the following PSG: young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe on whom FGC has not yet been forced and who 
 
 121 See, e.g., Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. 
Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007); see also Brief for Center for Gender and 
Refugee Studies as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re S-F-, B.I.A. (2008) 
(unpublished decision), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_SF_CGRS_
Amicus_08_2011_redacted_combined.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LGF-E8KB]. 
 122 See supra note 20 (providing examples of cases where forced marriage 
asylum cases failed due to failure to prove the nexus requirement). 
 123 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (social group 
asserted was “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had 
FGM . . . and who oppose the practice”); Ying Lin v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 319 F. App’x 777, 
779 (11th Cir. 2009) (the social group asserted was “unmarried women in a lower social 
class or in a rural area”); Brief for Center for Gender and Refugee Studies as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 121, at 34 (social group asserted was “young, 
single daughters from the [Wolof] ethnic group in Senegal who oppose forced marriage”); 
Feng Ming Lin v. Holder, 339 F. App’x 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (social group asserted was 
“young women in remote villages in the People’s Republic of China”); Lin v. Gonzales, 
148 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2005) (social group asserted was “young, unmarried Chinese 
woman living in a rural part of China”). 
 124 Ying Lin, 319 F. App’x at 780–81. 
 125 Id. at 779. 
 126 Id. at 780–81. 
2019] FROM FAMILY, THEY FLEE 1045 
oppose FGC.127 Ying Lin demonstrated how a broad PSG can fail, 
due to a lack of a clear nexus, while Kasinga demonstrated how a 
PSG whose specifics created a clear nexus to the harm, was 
successful.128 But, the challenge of asserting a group specific 
enough to be “socially distinct” while still outlining a “common 
immutable characteristic” is not a simple feat.129 
Prior federal decisions have made it difficult for judges to 
recognize combinations of gender and age as PSGs. In 1991 the 
Second Circuit opined that “[p]ossession of broadly-based 
characteristics such as youth and gender” does not allow an 
individual to claim membership to a PSG.130 Although asylum 
applications are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, asking an 
asylum officer or judge to recognize a social group made up of 
several different characteristics is risky. With no legal precedent 
recognizing the group as a PSG, it is difficult to predict whether 
a court or asylum officer will grant or deny a claim. A denial 
could have disastrous consequences: if USCIS denies an 
immigrant without lawful status asylum, they could be ordered 
to appear in removal proceedings, and eventually be deported.131 
Meaning, for some immigrants unlawfully present in the United 
States, who are genuinely fearful of returning to their home 
country, yet have a legally weak claim to asylum, their best 
option might be to not apply at all.132 Ideally, to maximize a 
person’s chances at gaining asylum, the PSG asserted would be 
simple, obvious, and previously recognized. 
There are many challenges to asserting a PSG based on 
mixed characteristics. First, placing marriage in a PSG connected 
to youth is limiting.133 In the introductory example to this note, 
the young woman was old enough to be in college, and thus, could 
 
 127 Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. 
 128 See Ying Lin, 319 F. App’x at 779; Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. 
 129 See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014); In re Acosta, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 130 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 131 How Refugees Get to the U.S., U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/58599d054.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2SZ-5LCP]. 
 132 See Keith Southam, Risks and Benefits to Affirmatively Applying for Asylum, 
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/risks-and-benefits-to-affirmatively-
applying-for-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/9Y62-NZ4E]. 
 133 The United States has taken legislative action against child marriage through 
the International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act. While the Act is 
important and well-intentioned, there might be an argument that the legislative action 
harms potential forced marriage-based asylum claims, as there is language in the act that 
conflates child marriage with forced marriage. The bill states that “child marriage, also 
known as ‘forced marriage’ or ‘early marriage,’ is a harmful traditional practice.” 
International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2010, S. 987, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (2010) (introduced May 6, 2009, passed in a vote by the Senate Dec. 1, 2010, failed 
in the House of Representatives on Dec. 16, 2010, and reintroduced on May 24, 2012). 
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be considered by some to no longer be a child.134 And yet, the 
pressures that force a woman into marriage do not suddenly 
disappear when she reaches the age of eighteen.135 Particularly if 
the victim comes from a small community with deeply entrenched 
cultural values, or who falls beneath the poverty line, the 
pressure is just as strong, and the means of escape from the 
marriage are extremely limited.136 
Second, placing forced marriage within a gender group is 
also problematic. Although the majority of forced marriages are 
inflicted on young girls or women,137 forced marriages can 
victimize men and boys as well.138 In recent years, the British 
government reported a sixty-five percent increase in calls from 
male victims to their Forced Marriage Unit139 and the U.S. 
Department of State reported in 2018 that fifteen percent of 
forced marriages abroad involve male victims.140 
Nevertheless, forced marriage does primarily affect young 
women and girls.141 Thus the problem should be viewed in the 
broader context of a manifestation of a general, wide-spread, 
global issue of violence against women.142 Alternatively, removing 
the harm of forced marriage from the gender category could result 
in the blame for the harm being placed solely on the practices or 
cultural norms of non-western communities.143 The patriarchal 
norm of general male superiority might get a free pass, while the 
fault for the practice of forced marriage would be attributed to 
cultural practices born from poverty.144 Fitting forced marriage 
into U.S. asylum law does not aim to suggest any sort of cultural 
 
 134 See supra Introduction. The INA defines a child as an “unmarried person 
under twenty-one years of age.” 8 U.S.C.A. 1101(b)(1) (2014). 
 135 See supra Part I. 
 136 See supra Part I. 
 137 In 2016, young girls and women represented eighty-four percent of all 
victims of forced marriage, and over one third of the victims were children at the time 
the marriage took place. Ninety-six percent of child victims were girls. INT’L LABOUR 
OFFICE, supra note 8, at 45–46. 
 138 See generally Yunas Samad, Forced Marriage Among Men: An Unrecognized 
Problem, 30 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 189 (2010) (exploring factors that lead to forced 
marriages among men and boys); see also REFUGE, supra note 60, at 6 (acknowledging 
briefly that men and boys are affected by forced marriage). A study conducted in the UK 
gave several examples of men they had interviewed who had been forced into marriage. 
One included a British Bangladeshi man who was taken to Bangladesh twice to be 
married. He escaped both marriages, but suffered increased mental health issues as a 
result. Hester, supra note 79, at 31. 
 139 Amelia Hill, More Men Seek Help with Forced Marriages, GUARDIAN (June 
30 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/01/men-help-forced-marriages-
rise [https://perma.cc/AG3S-3MWU]. 
 140 Forced Marriage, supra note 7. 
 141 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 8, at 11. 
 142 See Gill & Anitha, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
 143 See id. at 10–11. 
 144 Id. 
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superiority, or demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to practices born 
out of a basic human need to escape poverty.145 But, for the 
purposes of asylum claims, “gender” is too broad of a category.146 
And in narrowing a gender-based asylum claim, specific cultures 
or ethnic groups would most likely be asserted.147 Removing forced 
marriage from the protected group of gender, and arguably, from 
a feminist vocabulary, is simply to fit the harm within the 
statutory requirements of U.S. asylum law. 
3. Other Insufficient Approaches to Forced Marriage-
Based Claims 
Various scholars and advocates have attempted to find 
new solutions to forced marriage-based asylum claims by 
connecting them to other “protected grounds.” One U.K. scholar 
has advocated for removing forced marriage-based claims from 
the gender category within a PSG and placing the claims, instead, 
into the “underused” political opinion category.148 Many of the 
pressures forcing women and men into marriage stem from 
political norms compelling women and men to fill certain gender 
roles that the women and men might themselves oppose.149 Courts 
have opined that believing in “equal rights for women” constitutes 
a “political opinion” for purposes of asylum.150 
 
 145 See BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 14–15. 
 146 “Possession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender” does 
not allow an individual to claim membership to a “particular social group.” Gomez v. 
INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 147 For example, the social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.” 
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 148 See Nora Honkala, ‘She, of Course, Holds No Political Opinions’: Gendered 
Political Opinion Ground in Women’s Forced Marriage Asylum Claims, 26 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 166, 168 (2017) (arguing that forced marriage-based asylum claims could connect 
themselves to the protected ground of political opinion). 
 149 Id. at 9–10, 16–17. There could be an argument that forced marriage 
infringes on the political opinion of belief in monogamy. Of course, forced marriages are 
not necessarily polyamorous ones, but some are. One Canadian study notes: 
An additional emotional layer that is sometimes added to the painful ordeal of 
an undesired marriage is the discovery that their husbands already have 
another wife and family. They then unwittingly end up in a bigamous or 
polygamous relationship, which increases their vulnerability. The 
psychological and emotional consequences for these individuals are simply 
devastating. This is what happened to the young woman, mentioned above, 
who was forced by her aunt to marry a much older man. [TRANSLATION] “Yes 
they live together and they have children but she is unhappy because she found 
out later that the man had another wife and that his children by that other 
woman were practically her own age.” 
BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 23 (alteration in original). 
 150 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1237, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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The problem with the political opinion approach, 
however, lies within the nexus requirement. While the 
persecutor forcing the marriage onto the individual might hold 
a different political opinion than the victim, the determining 
question is why the persecutor is forcing this particular 
individual into marriage.151 Reports confirm that enforcing 
certain gender norms can be a motivation behind forced 
marriage,152 and in these limited circumstances, political opinion 
as the protected ground could be recognized. Still, changing 
someone’s political opinion—though it might be a part of the 
motivation—is not overwhelmingly one of the central reasons 
the practice of forced marriage exists.153 The consequence of 
changing or forcing a political opinion might exist within the 
practice of forced marriage, but consequence does not a 
motivation make. More often the person, or the family, who is 
the “forcer” of the marriage, is centrally motivated by the 
benefits the forced marriage will confer onto the family.154 
Forced marriage-based asylum applicants have also 
attempted to claim religion as their protected ground; in fact, 
one unpublished BIA decision represents a success for forced 
marriage claims in this regard.155 In Matter of S-F-, the 
petitioner asserted several different protected grounds: feminist 
political opinion, moderate Islamic religion, and “membership in 
the [PSG] of Senegalese women from the [Wolof] ethnic group 
who have been sold into marriage (whether or not the marriage 
 
 151 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that the 
persecutor’s motive is crucial to asylum claims). 
 152 See, e.g., BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 14 (“Forced marriage is also a way of 
controlling women’s sexuality. Some parents see forced marriage as a way of protecting 
their daughters against the risk of romantic relationships, and most importantly against 
sexual relations outside marriage. Above all, they are seeking to avoid pregnancies 
considered to be illegitimate that could result from this type of relationship. As far as 
many families are concerned, their reputation depends on the proper sexual behaviour 
of their members, especially the females. The patriarchal standards that are still valued 
in these families are reproduced in the society in which they settle. One of those 
standards is the duty to preserve virginity, which arises out of the desire to control 
women’s bodies in order to preserve family honour, and thus patriarchal power. Vigilance 
on this point of honour is strict and a forced marriage, preferably an early one, is the 
best defence against any challenge to that honour.”). 
 153 See generally BENDRISS, supra note 33 (political opinion not listed as one of the 
motivations behind the practice of forced marriage). While the study mentions that political 
context may help explain the practices of forced marriage, the political situation of a certain 
region differs from a desire to change someone’s political view, which in the context of forced 
marriage would be the political view of equal rights for women. See Section II.B.3 
(describing the political opinion approach to forced marriage-based asylum claims); see 
supra note 36 (various reports, studies, articles discussing the motivations behind forced 
marriage and none including the desire to change the victims political opinion). 
 154 See supra Part I.  
 155 See Matter of S-F-, CTR FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.
uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-s-f [https://perma.cc/M4XZ-B8AJ]. 
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has taken place).”156 The BIA held that the petitioner feared 
persecution on account of her religious beliefs, but because the 
decision is unpublished, the court’s reasoning is unavailable.157 
Although the BIA’s holding in Matter of S-F- is unique, 
religion-based forced marriage asylum claims could present 
similar issues to the political opinion-based claims. While the 
norms of a certain sect of a religion might encourage, or be one 
motivation for the persecutor to force someone into marriage,158 
the protected ground asserted must be the “central reason” for 
the persecution.159 This determination would need to come from 
a case-specific, factual inquiry into the motives behind the forced 
marriage of the specific asylum seeker.160 
While forcing someone into marriage could very likely force 
them to conform to religious standards they do not believe in, the 
“on account of” language of the nexus requirement makes the 
motive behind the persecution “critical.”161 Therefore, if a 
persecutor, in forcing the marriage to occur, is not primarily 
motivated by the wish to change or infringe upon the victim’s 
religious beliefs, a forced marriage-based asylum claim connected 
to the protected ground of religion would fail. 
4. Finding a Particular Social Group: Gao and Beyond 
After the Second Circuit granted a forced marriage-based 
asylum claim in 2006, a light shone brightly for those pushing 
for forced marriage as persecution. An overruling due to an error 
in standard of review, however, dimmed the excitement before 
the holding was put into practice.162 The asylum applicant in Gao 
v. Gonzales was a twenty-year-old woman from a rural village in 
China, an area with a pervasive cultural practice of selling 
daughters into marriage.163 Gao’s parents tried forcing her into 
a marriage with a man who, in return, would pay her family a 
 
 156 Brief for Center for Gender and Refugee Studies as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, supra note 121, at 1–2. 
 157 See Matter of S-F-, supra note 155. 
 158 BENDRISS, supra note 33, at 13.(“Some Muslim families erroneously believe 
that marrying their children even without their consent is a religious precept. Because 
of a literal reading and rigid interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith, certain 
segments of the Muslim population consider arranged and forced marriage a religious 
duty, thereby betraying the very essence of the message. That belief arises out of their 
confusion of cultural practices with religious principles.”). 
 159 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009). 
 160 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992). 
 161 See id. at 482–83. 
 162 See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Keisler 
v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007). 
 163 Gao, 440 F.3d at 64. 
1050 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
large sum of money.164 When Gao tried to break off the 
engagement due to the abuse she suffered at the hands of her 
future spouse, she was threatened with physical violence, and 
arrested by a powerful government official, who was an uncle of 
the man she was being forced to marry.165 Gao fled to the United 
States. Initially, an immigration judge determined that “Gao’s 
predicament did not arise from a protected ground such as 
membership in a particular social group but was simply ‘a 
dispute between two families.’”166 Gao appealed the decision. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit conducted a de novo inquiry 
of the immigration judge’s determinations of mixed questions of 
law and fact and recognized the PSG of “women who have been sold 
into marriage (whether or not the marriage has yet taken place) 
and who live in a part of China where forced marriages are 
considered valid and enforceable.”167 The Supreme Court vacated 
this judgment168 in light of Gonzales v. Thomas, where the Court 
determined that failure to remand the ‘social group’ question to the 
BIA was legally erroneous.169 Although the Second Circuit 
recognized a PSG encompassing future victims of forced marriage, 
the court erred in employing a de novo standard of review over the 
‘social group’ question, preventing the Supreme Court from ruling 
on the validity of the PSG recognized by the appellate court.170 
 Even if the Supreme Court had recognized the PSG 
asserted in Gao, the holding would nevertheless be problematic. 
The defined “protected ground,” the PSG of “women who have 
been sold into marriage,” does not fully comply with the nexus 
requirement of asylum claims, because it does away with the 
nexus all together.171 The protected ground in Gao was the forced 
marriage itself and the form of persecution claimed was also the 
forced marriage.172 The persecution and the protected ground 
were the same, thus making it difficult to prove a “nexus.”173 
 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 64–65. 
 167 Id. at 65, 70. 
 168 Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801, 801 (2007). 
 169 Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006). 
 170 See Keisler, 552 U.S. at 801; Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 185. 
 171 Gao, 440 F.3d at 70; see supra note 102 (providing an example to outline why 
the persecution and protected ground must be separate factors). 
 172 Gao asserted her protected ground as her membership in the PSG “women 
who have been sold into marriage.” Gao, 440 F.3d at 70. 
 173 See supra Section II.A; see supra note 103 (listing advisory memos from 
immigration advocacy groups advising attorneys to not conflate persecution with the 
protected ground); see supra note 102 (courts denying asylum claims due to this form of 
circular reasoning). 
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In Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit found a nexus in a forced marriage-based 
asylum claim, but its holding cannot be applied to a claim similar 
to the one discussed in the introductory hypothetical of this note.174 
First, similar to Gao, the court’s reasoning was circular: the 
persecution and the PSG were the same.175 The court recognized 
the PSG of “women in China who have been subjected to forced 
marriage and involuntary servitude.”176 The court reasoned that Bi 
Xia Qu was forced into marriage because she lived in a region 
accepting of the practice of forced marriage.177 Later, the BIA 
confused its holding, first stating Bi Xia Qu’s immutable 
characteristic “of being a woman who has been abducted by a man 
trying to force her into marriage in an area where forced marriages 
are [culturally] recognized.”178 It is unclear which PSG was actually 
accepted in Bi Xia Qu, but nevertheless, this circular reasoning 
seems to have worked for Bi Xia Qu’s claim because it was not her 
own family forcing her into marriage.179 
Second, motivations behind the particular forced 
marriage in Bi Xia Qu were different than many typical forced 
marriage situations. Interestingly, the central reason the 
powerful “thug” kidnapped Bi Xia Qu was because her father 
owed him money.180 Luckily, the court recognized that this was 
a “mixed-motive” case and found that the thug was also 
motivated by the fact that Bi Xia Qu was a woman living in an 
area where forced marriages are common.181 In cases similar to 
Bi Xia Qu, the asylum claim would not fit into a PSG based on 
membership to a particular family unit, as the sole forcer of the 
marriage came from outside the control of the victim’s family, 
and the central motivating factor could certainly be the existence 
of a pervasive cultural practice of forced marriages and human 
trafficking. But for an asylum claim based on a forced marriage 
perpetuated by someone within the victim’s family unit, the 
reasoning in Bi Xia Qu would be more difficult to apply. 
Furthermore, the PSG in Bi Xia Qu hinged on the idea 
that the act of the forced marriage was in progress.182 The 
questions then become: if someone is seeking asylum because of 
the certainty that if they return to their country of origin that 
 
 174 Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 175 Id. at 607–08. 
 176 Id. at 607. 
 177 Id. at 607–08. 
 178 Id. at 607. 
 179 Id. at 607–08. 
 180 Id. 604–05. 
 181 Id. at 607. 
 182 Id. at 607. 
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they will be subjected to forced marriage, how could their PSG 
be defined? Should these applicants assert a PSG similar to the 
one in Gao, as the PSG was initially accepted by the Second 
Circuit, or is there a more cognizable option? 
The PSG in Gao does not represent the best option for 
many forced marriage-based claims. Simply put, to firmly 
establish the nexus requirement of U.S. asylum claims, forced 
marriage should not be the protected ground if it is also the 
persecution.183 Usually, to prove nexus, a “protected ground” 
must be separate from the harm.184 The BIA’s reasoning in Bi Xia 
Qu and the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Gao demonstrate that 
adjudicators are willing to grant forced marriage-based asylum 
claims, if a nexus exists. The last sections of this note argue that 
in a situation similar to the hypothetical at the beginning of the 
note, where a family is forcing its younger member into a 
marriage, a nexus between the forced marriage and the 
protected ground of the family unit exists. 
III. MATTER OF L-E-A- AND THE PROTECTED GROUND OF 
FAMILY 
In 2017, in Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA held that family 
membership could qualify as a PSG for the purpose of asylum 
claims.185 The BIA stated that the “cognizable” nature of the 
family unit depends on “the nature and degree of the 
relationships involved and how those relationships are regarded 
 
 183 See supra Section II.A.  
 184 See supra Section II.A.  
 185 In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43–44 (B.I.A. 2017) (interim decision). Several 
circuit courts have held that family membership could be considered a PSG. See, e.g., 
Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949–50 (4th Cir. 2015) (mother’s relationship to 
her son was a central reason for persecution); Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding the BIA erred in not considering the asylum seeker’s family as a PSG); Crespin-
Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 121–23 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding “family members of those 
who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador” was a PSG). Prior to In re L-E-A-, the BIA had 
recognized that family ties could, depending on the facts and circumstances, constitute a PSG. 
See, e.g., In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006). This is the first BIA decision, 
however, to fully define the nexus requirement if the PSG is a family unit. The BIA usually 
defers to circuit court decisions for an asylum case appearing in a relevant jurisdiction, 
however, if a circuit court has not ruled on the issue, the BIA uses its own discretion, or 
relevant precedent. See In re Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31–32 (B.I.A. 1989); Laura S. Trice, 
Note, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review 
of Board of Immigration Appeals Decision, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1772 (2010) (“[T]he 
BIA . . . follows the law of a given circuit in cases arising within that circuit.”). Therefore, In 
re L-E-A is notable because it creates a precedent that could apply to all jurisdictions, whether 
a governing circuit court has ruled on the issue or not. See generally Jillian Blake, Protection 
for Families: New Standards Developing in Asylum Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV 49 (2016) 
(explaining how circuits differ in considering asylum claims with family-based particular 
social groups and arguing for a BIA ruling on the issue). 
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by the society in question.”186 Like all asylum claims, proving 
membership in a “cognizable”187 family unit is only the first step. 
As outlined in Matter of L-E-A-, to satisfy this nexus 
requirement in a family unit-based asylum claim, the asylum 
seeker “must demonstrate that the family relationship is at least 
one central reason for the claimed harm.”188 
In Matter of L-E-A-, the respondent, a Mexican citizen, 
sought asylum due to fear of persecution from a Mexican 
cartel.189 The Mexican cartel had asked the respondent’s father 
if they could sell drugs from the family’s grocery store.190 His 
father refused.191 Later, the cartel attempted, and failed, to 
kidnap the respondent and consequently, his father started 
paying the cartel a “rent” on the store.192 The respondent claimed 
fear of persecution on account of his membership in the PSG of 
his immediate family unit.193 The court found that the Mexican 
cartel’s primary motivations were general profit increase, rather 
than “other features unique to that family unit.”194 Although the 
respondent’s claim to asylum on the family unit ground failed, 
the decision notably determined how an asylum seeker must 
prove nexus in a claim where the PSG asserted is membership 
in a particular family unit.195 
In defining the nexus requirement, the BIA in Matter of L-
E-A- expressly laid out that family membership must be “one 
central reason” for the persecution.196 The BIA provided a “classic” 
example of where the persecutor was “seeking to harm the family 
members because of an animus against the family itself”: the 
Bolshevik assassination of the family of Czar Nicholas II, where 
their deaths were, by large part, due to their ties to the Czar.197 
The BIA further opined, however, that if animus is not per se 
implicated, the controlling question becomes: what is the 
persecutor’s primary motive?198 If the motive is kinship itself, then 
the claim satisfies the nexus requirement.199 
 
 186 L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 43; see also In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 
240 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 187 L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 43. 
 188 Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
 189 Id. at 41. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 41. 
 194 Id. at 46–47. 
 195 Id. at 42–44. 
 196 Id. at 44. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 45. 
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The BIA also stated that the persecution against common 
family members in a family unit-based asylum claim cannot be 
used as a means to a different end.200 This is where the respondent’s 
asylum claim in Matter of L-E-A- failed.201 Citing to an Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, the BIA stated businessmen in 
general were common targets of extortionate demands from gangs 
and criminal syndicates, therefore the family tie was merely 
incidental and the respondent did not prove that the Cartel 
targeted him primarily because of his family relationship.202 “If the 
persecutor would have treated the applicant the same if the 
protected characteristic of the family did not exist, then the 
applicant has not established a claim on this ground.”203 
IV. A NEXUS CREATED: FORCED MARRIAGE IS “ON ACCOUNT OF” 
FAMILY 
In light of Matter of L-E-A-, many asylum seekers basing 
their claims on a past, or threat of a future, forced marriage can 
connect their persecution to the PSG of the family unit.204 The 
harm of forced marriage often is perpetuated by someone within 
the victim’s family, and occurs on account of the victim’s place 
within that particular family. Further, forced marriage infringes 
on the protected ground of family membership because it forces 
its victims to join another family. Connecting the persecution of 
forced marriage to the recognized PSG of the family unit, in 
many cases, solves the all-important nexus issue. 
First, and perhaps most obvious, the act of forced marriage 
infringes on the victim’s protected ground of their family unit by 
requiring them to join a new family. Even the simple act of 
changing one’s last name demonstrates how marriage changes 
family ties and familial identity. Women who are forced into a 
marriage often are subsequently considered the property of their 
new husband and their new husband’s family.205 In some cases, 
these girls are carted off, far away from their original homes, 
never to see their families again.206 
Second, as outlined in Part I, the family benefits 
resulting from the forced marriage are often a central motivation 
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behind the forced marriage itself.207 The persecutor, the forcer of 
the marriage, is often motivated by a desire to use the younger 
persons’ place within the family unit as a tool to benefit the 
family. But-for their membership to their particular family, 
many victims of forced marriage would not experience this 
harm.208 Therefore, forced marriage-based asylum claims, where 
the persecutor is primarily motivated by future family benefit, 
should be connected to the PSG of the “family unit,” as the nexus 
requirement will be satisfied, falling in line with the BIA’s 
reasoning in Matter of L-E-A-.209 
The persecutor forcing marriage is often within the 
family of the victim, which contrasts to the alleged persecutors 
in Matter of L-E-A-, who were outside of the victim’s family 
unit.210 Nowhere in Matter of L-E-A-, however, does the BIA state 
that the persecutor must come from outside the family unit.211 
While odd to imagine someone from within the protected class 
persecuting other members of the class on account of their 
membership to the class, this reasoning is not so left-field as it 
may seem. Often PSGs asserted in asylum claims directly apply 
to the persecutors themselves, or perhaps only need modification 
in gender or age. For example, courts recognize membership in 
a particular tribe as a protected ground for asylum claims.212 One 
might imagine an older leader of a tribe harming a younger 
member of the tribe specifically due to their membership in the 
tribe. In that case, the persecutor would also belong to the same 
protected class as the asylum seeker. 
Although animus against a family unit is not per se 
implicated in a forced marriage-based case, which under Matter of 
L-E-A- would result in a clear satisfaction of the nexus requirement, 
the underlying motive still satisfies the nexus requirement.213 
Falling directly in line with the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of L-E-A-, 
it is often the kinship ties between the victim and their family which 
causes them to be forced into marriage.214 Despite the seemingly 
opposite motives—in animus cases a motive being to harm the 
family, and in forced marriage cases, a motive being to benefit the 
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family—in both cases, the PSG of being a part of a particular family 
unit is the central reason for the persecution.215 
A counterargument could be made that the forced 
marriage is simply a means to a different end, the end being one 
of the family-based motivations, such as money or preserving 
family honor, as outlined in the first part of this note.216 Notably, 
this is where respondent’s claims to asylum in Matter of L-E-A- 
failed.217 Forced marriage differs from the claim in Matter of L-E-
A-, however, because the cartel in Matter of L-E-A-, as noted by 
the BIA, generally targeted all businessmen.218 In contrast, 
perpetrators of forced marriage are only targeting younger 
members of their specific family unit.219 They are not generally 
targeting anyone outside of their family unit who might be able 
to generate the family wealth by forcing them into marriage. They 
are forcing the younger generation into marriage first and 
foremost because they are their family. Additionally, these other 
motivations, like increasing family wealth, all tie themselves 
back, as well, to the protected class. Therefore, a central, 
motivating factor behind these forced marriages is the victim’s 
protected ground of their kinship ties. 
To be clear, if family is the asserted “protected ground” in 
a forced marriage-based asylum claim, forced marriage itself 
must be the persecution. Despite the United States’ legally 
recognized right to marry and right to choose one’s spouse,220 U.S. 
asylum law still treats forced marriage as persecution only when 
combined with other crimes.221 Other harms associated with 
forced marriage may seem more violent on their face but claiming 
the inhumane nature of forced marriage solely due to those harms 
is a mistake. Crimes are not “watertight compartment[s].”222 
Forced marriage is a precursor and an umbrella cause of many 
crimes—such as sexual slavery, forced domestic labor, forced 
pregnancy, rape, and FGC—and thus, should be considered, on 
its face, a form of persecution.223 
In order for adjudicators to grant solely forced marriage-
based asylum claims, forced marriage needs to have its own nexus  
 215 L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 44; see supra Part I.  
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to a legally recognized protected ground.224 If forced marriage is 
viewed as the harm, the asylum claim must be based within the 
central motives of the persecutor forcing the marriage.225 As these 
motives are reported to often be primarily influenced by family 
ties, forced marriage-based asylum claims should be connected to 
the PSG of the family unit.226 Furthermore, the family member 
who sells the victim off could not have a hand in the other crimes 
connected with forced marriage; those other forms of persecution 
usually come from the new spouse or the new spouse’s family.227 
Therefore, recognizing forced marriage as its own crime helps to 
firmly establish the nexus. 
CONCLUSION  
Individuals seeking asylum from forced marriage are 
having trouble proving their claims. It is hard to fit a harm that 
stems from a variety of motives into the specific, statutory 
requirements of asylum law. But one primary motive behind 
forced marriage is clear: families are targeting their own 
members to benefit the family itself. Further, forced marriage 
infringes upon a protected ground that has been expressly 
recognized by case law as a PSG: the family unit. 
Applying the reasoning in Matter of L-E-A- to a form of 
family-based persecution, where the persecutor is a member of 
the family unit, may seem to be a game of judicial gymnastics. 
Yet, asylum applicants must frame the harm they have faced or 
will face if returned to their own country in a very particular 
way, even if overwhelming proof exists of said harm. An 
arguably stretched form of reasoning aligns perfectly with how 
the case law around asylum claims operates. 
Forced marriage is a form of persecution that comes from 
within one’s family unit. But it is an act that occurs because of 
one’s place within a certain family unit. The persecutor is 
normally a family member, acting with specific family-based 
motivations, only realized due to the victim’s place within the 
family. Further, forced marriage violates upon and tries to 
change its victims’ family ties. It forces its victims to join a new 
family and to create a new family with someone they did not 
choose. Therefore, force marriage should be viewed as 
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persecution against one’s place within their family unit and 
recognized as such by U.S. asylum adjudicators. 
Forced marriage is essentially a form of slavery.228 People’s 
lives are not chattels. People’s family ties should not be used as 
currency. As this form of persecution fits into U.S. asylum law 
through the PSG of a “family unit,” the United States must 
recognize forced marriage-based asylum claims so these young 
people can live brilliantly, free from a life of oppression. 
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